For approximately 2 months, Richard S. Weinstock issued 13 speeding citations that would never hold up in court. Not only would they not hold up in court, but nearly every citation for each month had the same clocked speed. I find that very hard to believe and it appears that Trooper Richard S. Weinstock was doing the dirty work to fill the coffers or just being some egotistical, power hungry asshole.

02/15/2010 – Citation No. T0019810-0 – 59MPH in 50MPH zone – Plead Guilty
02/15/2010 – Citation No. T0019811-1 – 57MPH in 50MPH zone – Plead Guilty
02/15/2010 – Citation No. T0039503-2 – 58MPH in 50MPH zone – Plead Guilty
02/15/2010 – Citation No. T0039504-3 – 57MPH in 50MPH zone – Plead Guilty
02/15/2010 – Citation No. T0039506-5 – 58MPH in 50MPH zone – Plead Guilty
02/20/2010 – Citation No. T0041161-1 – 58MPH in 50MPH zone – Found Not Guilty
02/20/2010 – Citation No. T0041165-5 – 58MPH in 50MPH zone – Found Not Guilty
03/09/2010 – Citation No. T0072238-5 – 53MPH in 45MPH zone – Plead Guilty
03/09/2010 – Citation No. T0072241-1 – 53MPH in 45MPH zone – Plead Guilty
03/09/2010 – Citation No. T0072246-6 – 54MPH in 45MPH zone – Plead Guilty
03/25/2010 – Citation No. T0087444-0 – 54MPH in 45MPH zone – Plead Guilty
03/25/2010 – Citation No. T0087439-2 – 54MPH in 45MPH zone – Plead Guilty
03/25/2010 – Citation No. T0087430-0 – 54MPH in 45MPH zone – Plead Guilty

Title 75 Subsection 3368(c)(4) of the Pennsylvania Vehicle code specifically states the following:

no person may be convicted upon evidence obtained through the use of devices authorized by paragraph (3) in an area where the legal speed limit is less than 55 miles per hour if the speed recorded is less than ten miles per hour in excess of the legal speed limit

All of the citations issued were less than ten miles per hour in excess of the legal speed limit which was less than 55 miles per hour. The actual citations also have no indication that they were in a school or active work zone, which is the only way these would hold up. Richard S. Weinstock surely must have known these were bogus tickets, so why was he issuing them? Perhaps he had a nice racket setup with Michael G. Dotzel to give out bogus tickets in hopes that those cited did not know the law and would just pay up? Not only does Richard Weinstock not no the law, but neither does Michael G. Dotzel of Magisterial District 11-3-07, who willingly convicted the cited. Certainly these tickets should have been tossed out along with Richard Weinstock. Only 2 motorists out of the 13 apparently new the law and were smart enough to challenge it. The rest paid the bogus tickets and most likely had their insurance raised due to it. In total, $1,384 in fines were paid and wrongfully collected.

BONUS: Not only does Richard S. Weinstock issue bogus speeding tickets, but apparently some think he is a sex crazed pervert who chose to sexually discriminate a female Pennsylvania State Police employee by the name of Laura Zelinski in 1999. Once, Weinstock put his hand on Zelinski’s leg and propositioned her. Another time, he described sexual acts in graphic detail. One day he told her he could see her underwear. And on another occasion he told her, “If I can see down your sweater, everyone else can.” After Zelinski complained to a supervisor, she was transferred shortly after and filed a sexual discrimination lawsuit. You can read all about it here in the court document: Zelinski v. PSP

How the hell is this guy allowed to be a Pennsylvania State Police Trooper with all of this blatant misconduct and why is Michael G. Dotzel allowed to run an illegal speeding ticket racket?

To start off, part of my RTKL request was for all of the traffic citations and calibration/testing certificates for one specific GHS Radar gun (GHS2730 to be exact). No particular reason why I chose that specific GHS Radar Gun, other than that I just wanted to do a small controlled study on a single radar unit to see if I could identify any odd patterns with either the citations or calibration tests. Well here are my short initial findings (just got the documents today).

Calibration testing history for GHS2730:

Bold is my own emphasis. Now when I first reviewed some of the citations given with GHS2730, I thought I saw a glaring problem, however, I was mistaken. In 2009, a House Bill was passed and according to Pennsylvania’s Vehicle Code, Title 75, Subsection 3368(d), radar units only need to be calibrated yearly. Previously they needed to be calibrated every 60 days. Why do you think this was done? Quick way to make money and create less possibilities for lapses in calibration and create less court challenges? A February 2004 staff study completed by Sergeant Martin L. Henry III of the Pennsylvania State Police, which I’ll be posting at a later date, even states that “this legislation would affect current Department operations and require changes to existing regulations. This may also have an effect on maintenance. Common maintenance issues detected during routine calibration may not be observed in a timely manner, resulting in more costly repairs.”

As you can see, the table shows some slight lapses. One point of interest is the testing on July 11 and July 16 of 2008. The calibration charts looked nearly identical, so perhaps this particular unit had field problems reported after the first calibration. I have no other explanation for why it would be tested again so soon and I can’t verify if any tickets were given out in that time frame because all of those citations are hand written and did not copy well.

Not only is there a greater time frame for these radar devices to become uncalibrated and start presenting problems, but many of the troopers using them do not have the proper training to identify problems.  Most troopers are completely unaware of the reported problems with GHS radar guns and have no knowledge on what will cause false readings, relying on the output 100%. This is not proper use of a radar gun and you can use this lack of knowledge as ammo in court. Keep fighting!

(a)  Speedometers authorized.–The rate of speed of any vehicle may be timed on any highway by a police officer using a motor vehicle equipped with a speedometer. In ascertaining the speed of a vehicle by the use of a speedometer, the speed shall be timed for a distance of not less than three-tenths of a mile.

(b)  Testing of speedometers.–The department may appoint stations for testing speedometers and may prescribe regulations as to the manner in which the test shall be made. Speedometers shall have been tested for accuracy within a period of one year prior to the alleged violation and immediately upon change of tire size. A certificate from the station showing that the test was made, the date of the test and the degree of accuracy of the speedometer shall be competent and prima facie evidence of those facts in every proceeding in which a violation of this title is charged.

(c)  Mechanical, electrical and electronic devices authorized.–

(1)  Except as otherwise provided in this section, the rate of speed of any vehicle may be timed on any highway by a police officer using a mechanical or electrical speed timing device.

(2)  Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (3), electronic devices such as radio-microwave devices (commonly referred to as electronic speed meters or radar) may be used only by members of the Pennsylvania State Police.

(3)  Electronic devices which calculate speed by measuring elapsed time between measured road surface points by using two sensors and devices which measure and calculate the average speed of a vehicle between any two points may be used by any police officer.

(4)  No person may be convicted upon evidence obtained through the use of devices authorized by paragraphs (2) and (3) unless the speed recorded is six or more miles per hour in excess of the legal speed limit. Furthermore, no person may be convicted upon evidence obtained through the use of devices authorized by paragraph (3) in an area where the legal speed limit is less than 55 miles per hour if the speed recorded is less than ten miles per hour in excess of the legal speed limit. This paragraph shall not apply to evidence obtained through the use of devices authorized by paragraph (2) or (3) within a school zone or an active work zone.

(d)  Classification, approval and testing of mechanical, electrical and electronic devices.–The department may, by regulation, classify specific devices as being mechanical, electrical or electronic. All mechanical, electrical or electronic devices shall be of a type approved by the department, which shall appoint stations for calibrating and testing the devices and may prescribe regulations as to the manner in which calibrations and tests shall be made. The certification and calibration of electronic devices under subsection (c)(3) shall also include the certification and calibration of all equipment, timing strips and other devices which are actually used with the particular electronic device being certified and calibrated. Electronic devices commonly referred to as electronic speed meters or radar shall have been tested for accuracy within a period of one year prior to the alleged violation. Other devices shall have been tested for accuracy within a period of 60 days prior to the alleged violation. A certificate from the station showing that the calibration and test were made within the required period and that the device was accurate shall be competent and prima facie evidence of those facts in every proceeding in which a violation of this title is charged.

(e)  Distance requirements for use of mechanical, electrical and electronic devices.–Mechanical, electrical or electronic devices may not be used to time the rate of speed of vehicles within 500 feet after a speed limit sign indicating a decrease of speed. This limitation on the use of speed timing devices shall not apply to speed limit signs indicating school zones, bridge and elevated structure speed limits, hazardous grade speed limits and work zone speed limits.

(July 11, 1985, P.L.204, No.52, eff. 60 days; Mar. 27, 1986, P.L.71, No.24, eff. imd.; Dec. 23, 2002, P.L.1982, No.229, eff. 6 months; Nov. 26, 2008, P.L.1658, No.133, eff. 60 days) 2008 Amendment.  Act 133 amended subsecs. (b) and (d). 2002 Amendment.  Act 229 amended subsec. (c)(4). See section 21 of Act 229 in the appendix to this title for special provisions relating to promulgation of guidelines to implement Act 229. 1986 Amendment.  Act 24 amended subsecs. (c) and (d). 1985 Amendment.  Act 52 amended subsec. (c) and added subsec. (e).

Source: http://www.legis.state.pa.us/WU01/LI/LI/CT/HTM/75/75.HTM

With recent “enhancements” in technology, the Pennsylvania State Police now file all citations electronically through the TraCS (Traffic and Criminal Software) system. Yes, this may reduce a lot of overhead and manual data entry, however, it also introduces numerous security risks.

Here are the detailed steps that a trooper performs to create a citation in the TraCS system:

Pennsylvania State Police eFiling Work Flow

Step #1

• PSP Trooper initiates a traffic stop and begins the citation issuance process.
• The Trooper accesses the Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Traffic and Criminal Software (TraCS) in their vehicle.
• Using the TraCS software, the Trooper enters information into the TraCS e-citation module.
• The Trooper then submits the citation electronically and provides a printed copy to the driver.

Step #2

• An electronic copy of the information submitted by the Trooper into TraCS is encrypted and sent over the Commonwealth 800MHz radio system to the TraCS application server at PSP.
• The information is stored in the PSP TraCS database.

Step #3

• The JNET Integration Bridge (JIBlet) monitors the TraCS citation database for changes.
• When updates are detected, JNET secures a copy of the information from the citation and passes it to the JNET – AOPC messaging queue.

Step #4

• The citation information is published to the AOPC Court Filing Server.
• AOPC validates that the information received from JNET is properly configured and formatted.

Step #5

• The citation information is then published to the work queue for the staff of the specific AOPC Magisterial District Judge (MDJ) who’s jurisdiction the citation was issued.

Step #6

• Each MDJ office has staff specifically responsible for checking and importing e-citation submission into their MDJ records management system.
• Once MDJ staff accepts and imports the citation, MDJ staff members proceed through their usual course of business in the processing and filing of the citation; including the scheduling of hearing dates for the defendant and/or payments accepted.
• The importation of the e-citation by the MDH staff replaces staff from having to manually enter in information from the physical citation that the Trooper would physical deliver to the MDJ office.

Refer to the Visio diagram below for additional network infrastructure and a visual view (click to view full size):

Granted, this is a fairly simplified view of their network infrastructure, but surprising none the less that they gave this to me, but not the records I requested. After viewing the steps and diagram, you’re probably already thinking of a few ways to hack a speeding ticket or another citation…well here’s a theoretical breakdown for you:

• Create an 800MHz jammer – Although this would be considered illegal, one can easily be made with basic electronics knowledge. All citation data from the trooper’s vehicle is sent over an 800MHz encrypted wireless radio network. Jam the signal and nothing is going to get sent. Granted, they most likely have some type of fail or batch processing system in place to send the data later (maybe not), but if you can jam all signals from being sent to or from a trooper’s vehicle, then they may just let you go thinking there is something wrong with their car or equipment.
• 800MHz receiver and sniffer – With a receiver and sniffer, theoretically you can capture the signals sent to and from the trooper’s vehicle to later analyze and attack their encryption method. Theoretically you can discover enough information to transmit false citation information and attack the TraCS application server directly.
• Denial of Service attack on JIBlet – It’s firewalled, but theoretically, you can perform a DoS attack on it so it would never pass any information onto the messaging queue or other servers further in the process.
• Data modification/corruption – Theoretically you could somehow modify the data that’s sent from JIBlet to the AOPC to make it so it is never valid and generates rejection messages.
• Social Engineering – This is probably the easiest attack as people are always the weakest link in any system. Social engineering attacks could be performed on employees of any of the agencies who maintain servers/data part of the citation filing process. Personally if I were to perform such an attack, I would most likely focus on the lower level MDJ offices and the AOPC to essentially delete the records for you. Existing backups and any replication of the data is unknown, but from my research and what was stated in other RTKL requests (probably lies), it is believed that only the local MDJ office stores the final citation information as the local courts are who you must request citation records from. Certainly, I am sure they would have copies of the data stored on the other servers it passes through, but they stated to me that “JNET does not keep/retain the information”. This depends on one’s definition of JNET, however, JNET is a network, which would consist of all the devices and servers connected to it. Apparently the Agency Open Records Officer of the Pennsylvania Office of Administration (the agency that controls JNET) thinks of it only as a communications signal not including any of the devices connected to it. Does not compute.

The state police released numerous press releases stating that the University of Pittsburgh and other studies proved the guns were accurate, when the studies showed otherwise.

Marlin Mickle, an author of the University of Pittsburgh report, later told the Daily News that his report did not say the guns give accurate readings.

Mickle also stated the state police never told him about its own tests that identified the alternator as the problem or of the problems with the Motorola laptops.

And here we go again…Why do the Pennsylvania State Police continue to say the reports show the guns are accurate when the very people conducting the studies/tests state that they didn’t show they were accurate? Lies and deceit!

Download the article here.

Download the article here.

Judge Sylvia Rambo stated the following:

“The discovery materials the PSP (Pennsylvania State Police) has disclosed to plaintiff, if released to the media, threaten to prejudice the public from which jurors will be selected.”

Alright, so how is the public knowing the facts about the matter going to prejudice them if they are jurors? If anything, it makes them more educated jurors. The sad part is that the PSP continue to spew their own version of the story on their Web site. Is that not prejudicing the public?

Download the article here.

State police at one time believed the radar guns were prone to malfunction only when plugged into the cigarette lighter of 2003 or 2004 Ford police cars. The Motorola report, though, says any Crown Victoria police car’s electrical system can be trouble, especially in cars with older batteries.

The report concludes that the array of police lights, radios, computers and other power equipment overloads the cars’ electrical system and introduces electrical noise, which interferes with the computers and radar guns.

So, as you can see, Motorola basically states that the Ford Crown Victoria’s used by the Pennsylvania State Police are just overloaded with electrical equipment that causes numerous problems, including introducing electrical noise which can cause interference and make the GHS radar guns produce false readings, but wait, the PSP continue to state that all of these studies prove, without a shadow of a doubt, that the guns are accurate. Why are these reports stating and showing the complete opposite?

Download the article here.

Download the article here.

Download the article here.