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Archive for the ‘Other Documents (Transcripts/Manuals/Reports)’ Category

Pennsylvania State Police Trooper Richard S. Weinstock Issuing Bogus Speeding Tickets

Tuesday, July 13th, 2010

This is a second part to the recent Right-To-Know-Law requests I made for the single GHS radar unit GHS2730. In reviewing citations given with GHS2730, I came upon an interesting pattern with one particular trooper by the name of Richard S. Weinstock.

For approximately 2 months, Richard S. Weinstock issued 13 speeding citations that would never hold up in court. Not only would they not hold up in court, but nearly every citation for each month had the same clocked speed. I find that very hard to believe and it appears that Trooper Richard S. Weinstock was doing the dirty work to fill the coffers or just being some egotistical, power hungry asshole.

02/15/2010 – Citation No. T0019810-0 – 59MPH in 50MPH zone – Plead Guilty
02/15/2010 – Citation No. T0019811-1 – 57MPH in 50MPH zone – Plead Guilty
02/15/2010 – Citation No. T0039503-2 – 58MPH in 50MPH zone – Plead Guilty
02/15/2010 – Citation No. T0039504-3 – 57MPH in 50MPH zone – Plead Guilty
02/15/2010 – Citation No. T0039506-5 – 58MPH in 50MPH zone – Plead Guilty
02/20/2010 – Citation No. T0041161-1 – 58MPH in 50MPH zone – Found Not Guilty
02/20/2010 – Citation No. T0041165-5 – 58MPH in 50MPH zone – Found Not Guilty
03/09/2010 – Citation No. T0072238-5 – 53MPH in 45MPH zone – Plead Guilty
03/09/2010 – Citation No. T0072241-1 – 53MPH in 45MPH zone – Plead Guilty
03/09/2010 – Citation No. T0072246-6 – 54MPH in 45MPH zone – Plead Guilty
03/25/2010 – Citation No. T0087444-0 – 54MPH in 45MPH zone – Plead Guilty
03/25/2010 – Citation No. T0087439-2 – 54MPH in 45MPH zone – Plead Guilty
03/25/2010 – Citation No. T0087430-0 – 54MPH in 45MPH zone – Plead Guilty

Title 75 Subsection 3368(c)(4) of the Pennsylvania Vehicle code specifically states the following:

no person may be convicted upon evidence obtained through the use of devices authorized by paragraph (3) in an area where the legal speed limit is less than 55 miles per hour if the speed recorded is less than ten miles per hour in excess of the legal speed limit

All of the citations issued were less than ten miles per hour in excess of the legal speed limit which was less than 55 miles per hour. The actual citations also have no indication that they were in a school or active work zone, which is the only way these would hold up. Richard S. Weinstock surely must have known these were bogus tickets, so why was he issuing them? Perhaps he had a nice racket setup with Michael G. Dotzel to give out bogus tickets in hopes that those cited did not know the law and would just pay up? Not only does Richard Weinstock not no the law, but neither does Michael G. Dotzel of Magisterial District 11-3-07, who willingly convicted the cited. Certainly these tickets should have been tossed out along with Richard Weinstock. Only 2 motorists out of the 13 apparently new the law and were smart enough to challenge it. The rest paid the bogus tickets and most likely had their insurance raised due to it. In total, $1,384 in fines were paid and wrongfully collected.

BONUS: Not only does Richard S. Weinstock issue bogus speeding tickets, but apparently some think he is a sex crazed pervert who chose to sexually discriminate a female Pennsylvania State Police employee by the name of Laura Zelinski in 1999. Once, Weinstock put his hand on Zelinski’s leg and propositioned her. Another time, he described sexual acts in graphic detail. One day he told her he could see her underwear. And on another occasion he told her, “If I can see down your sweater, everyone else can.” After Zelinski complained to a supervisor, she was transferred shortly after and filed a sexual discrimination lawsuit. You can read all about it here in the court document: Zelinski v. PSP

How the hell is this guy allowed to be a Pennsylvania State Police Trooper with all of this blatant misconduct and why is Michael G. Dotzel allowed to run an illegal speeding ticket racket?

Pennsylvania State Police Still Using Faulty Radar Guns & No Longer Need to Calibrate within 60 Days

Tuesday, July 13th, 2010

After giving up the fight for a few years, a couple of months ago I decided to start digging into the GHS Radar Gun Scandal again. It’s a real problem that I believe all Pennsylvania residents deserve to know about, but nobody seems to care cause it’s all about money…much like the natural gas drilling destruction that’s going on in Northeastern Pennsylvania and throughout the state. I made some Right-To-Know-Law requests and got my hands on some interesting material they refused to send me in previous requests, prior to the Right-To-Know-Law being changed to force the burden of proof on the institution or agency instead of the requester. This is the first part of a series of new information I plan on posting.

To start off, part of my RTKL request was for all of the traffic citations and calibration/testing certificates for one specific GHS Radar gun (GHS2730 to be exact). No particular reason why I chose that specific GHS Radar Gun, other than that I just wanted to do a small controlled study on a single radar unit to see if I could identify any odd patterns with either the citations or calibration tests. Well here are my short initial findings (just got the documents today).

Calibration testing history for GHS2730:

Date of Calibration Test Number of Days from last test
03/22/2010 367
03/20/2009 64
01/15/2009 59
11/17/2008 63
09/15/2008 61
07/16/2008 5
07/11/2008 56
05/16/2008 59
03/18/2008 61
01/17/2008 59
11/19/2007 61
09/19/2007 62
07/19/2007 59
05/21/2007 66
03/16/2007 Unknown

Bold is my own emphasis. Now when I first reviewed some of the citations given with GHS2730, I thought I saw a glaring problem, however, I was mistaken. In 2009, a House Bill was passed and according to Pennsylvania’s Vehicle Code, Title 75, Subsection 3368(d), radar units only need to be calibrated yearly. Previously they needed to be calibrated every 60 days. Why do you think this was done? Quick way to make money and create less possibilities for lapses in calibration and create less court challenges? A February 2004 staff study completed by Sergeant Martin L. Henry III of the Pennsylvania State Police, which I’ll be posting at a later date, even states that “this legislation would affect current Department operations and require changes to existing regulations. This may also have an effect on maintenance. Common maintenance issues detected during routine calibration may not be observed in a timely manner, resulting in more costly repairs.”

As you can see, the table shows some slight lapses. One point of interest is the testing on July 11 and July 16 of 2008. The calibration charts looked nearly identical, so perhaps this particular unit had field problems reported after the first calibration. I have no other explanation for why it would be tested again so soon and I can’t verify if any tickets were given out in that time frame because all of those citations are hand written and did not copy well.

Not only is there a greater time frame for these radar devices to become uncalibrated and start presenting problems, but many of the troopers using them do not have the proper training to identify problems.  Most troopers are completely unaware of the reported problems with GHS radar guns and have no knowledge on what will cause false readings, relying on the output 100%. This is not proper use of a radar gun and you can use this lack of knowledge as ammo in court. Keep fighting!

How to Hack a Speeding Ticket and Pennsylvania State Police E-Filing Workflow

Wednesday, May 26th, 2010

I obtained some interesting material through a Right-To-Know-Law request recently. This was material that I did not even request, however, I thought it was rather useful for anyone interested in the computer networks of the Pennsylvania State Police and other PA agencies. WARNING: I do not condone, nor am I supporting hacking, DoSing, signal jamming, or anything else that would be deemed illegal by the state of Pennsylvania. This is merely an analysis of research and theoretical based discussion.

With recent “enhancements” in technology, the Pennsylvania State Police now file all citations electronically through the TraCS (Traffic and Criminal Software) system. Yes, this may reduce a lot of overhead and manual data entry, however, it also introduces numerous security risks.

Here are the detailed steps that a trooper performs to create a citation in the TraCS system:

Pennsylvania State Police eFiling Work Flow

Step #1

  • PSP Trooper initiates a traffic stop and begins the citation issuance process.
  • The Trooper accesses the Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Traffic and Criminal Software (TraCS) in their vehicle.
  • Using the TraCS software, the Trooper enters information into the TraCS e-citation module.
  • The Trooper then submits the citation electronically and provides a printed copy to the driver.

Step #2

  • An electronic copy of the information submitted by the Trooper into TraCS is encrypted and sent over the Commonwealth 800MHz radio system to the TraCS application server at PSP.
  • The information is stored in the PSP TraCS database.

Step #3

  • The JNET Integration Bridge (JIBlet) monitors the TraCS citation database for changes.
  • When updates are detected, JNET secures a copy of the information from the citation and passes it to the JNET – AOPC messaging queue.

Step #4

  • The citation information is published to the AOPC Court Filing Server.
  • AOPC validates that the information received from JNET is properly configured and formatted.

Step #5

  • The citation information is then published to the work queue for the staff of the specific AOPC Magisterial District Judge (MDJ) who’s jurisdiction the citation was issued.

Step #6

  • Each MDJ office has staff specifically responsible for checking and importing e-citation submission into their MDJ records management system.
  • Once MDJ staff accepts and imports the citation, MDJ staff members proceed through their usual course of business in the processing and filing of the citation; including the scheduling of hearing dates for the defendant and/or payments accepted.
  • The importation of the e-citation by the MDH staff replaces staff from having to manually enter in information from the physical citation that the Trooper would physical deliver to the MDJ office.

Refer to the Visio diagram below for additional network infrastructure and a visual view (click to view full size):

Granted, this is a fairly simplified view of their network infrastructure, but surprising none the less that they gave this to me, but not the records I requested. After viewing the steps and diagram, you’re probably already thinking of a few ways to hack a speeding ticket or another citation…well here’s a theoretical breakdown for you:

  • Create an 800MHz jammer – Although this would be considered illegal, one can easily be made with basic electronics knowledge. All citation data from the trooper’s vehicle is sent over an 800MHz encrypted wireless radio network. Jam the signal and nothing is going to get sent. Granted, they most likely have some type of fail or batch processing system in place to send the data later (maybe not), but if you can jam all signals from being sent to or from a trooper’s vehicle, then they may just let you go thinking there is something wrong with their car or equipment.
  • 800MHz receiver and sniffer – With a receiver and sniffer, theoretically you can capture the signals sent to and from the trooper’s vehicle to later analyze and attack their encryption method. Theoretically you can discover enough information to transmit false citation information and attack the TraCS application server directly.
  • Denial of Service attack on JIBlet – It’s firewalled, but theoretically, you can perform a DoS attack on it so it would never pass any information onto the messaging queue or other servers further in the process.
  • Data modification/corruption – Theoretically you could somehow modify the data that’s sent from JIBlet to the AOPC to make it so it is never valid and generates rejection messages.
  • Social Engineering – This is probably the easiest attack as people are always the weakest link in any system. Social engineering attacks could be performed on employees of any of the agencies who maintain servers/data part of the citation filing process. Personally if I were to perform such an attack, I would most likely focus on the lower level MDJ offices and the AOPC to essentially delete the records for you. Existing backups and any replication of the data is unknown, but from my research and what was stated in other RTKL requests (probably lies), it is believed that only the local MDJ office stores the final citation information as the local courts are who you must request citation records from. Certainly, I am sure they would have copies of the data stored on the other servers it passes through, but they stated to me that “JNET does not keep/retain the information”. This depends on one’s definition of JNET, however, JNET is a network, which would consist of all the devices and servers connected to it. Apparently the Agency Open Records Officer of the Pennsylvania Office of Administration (the agency that controls JNET) thinks of it only as a communications signal not including any of the devices connected to it. Does not compute.

03/12/2004 – Decatur Electronics Response to Takin’ Aim At Radar Guns

Tuesday, April 29th, 2008

This is another document I received from Decatur Electronics. It is their response to the Takin’ Aim At Radar Guns article published by the Philadelphia Daily News.

Decatur states: We believe the claims and allegations against the State Police and the product to be erroneous and misleading.

Basically they state the guns are accurate as well. Of course they are! It’s their product and they want to sell it! The funny thing is that Genesis Handheld Stationary models have been discontinued for quite some time and were replaced with the Genesis Handheld Directional models…I wonder why?


Download the document here.

03/10/2004 – Decatur Electronics Statement Regarding GHS Radar

Tuesday, April 29th, 2008

I had made a written request to Decatur Electronics along with several phone calls to try and obtain additional information on the Gensis Handheld Stationary (GHS) radar scandal in Pennsylvania. That was a fun task in itself and I spoke with a very rude woman who hung the phone up on me when I questioned her about the problems.

This is a document that they sent me in the mail. In short, it states the Pennsylvania State Police know more about the problem than they do and that they should be contacted directly. So I filled out a Right-To-Know Law request form (actually had to do it several times), and didn’t get any other information other than to go to the Pennsylvania State Police Web site that contained nothing but broken links.


Download Decatur’s statement here.

University of Pittsburgh GHS Final Evaluation Report

Monday, April 28th, 2008

This is the final report from the University of Pittsburgh when they conducted their tests on the Genesis Handheld Stationary (GHS) radar unit. After filing a Right-To-Know Law Request form to obtain this document, I was instructed I could get it from the Pennsylvania State Polices’ Web site. I went there and the link was dead. It has never worked. I obtained this document through other means and provide it here for others.

The University of Pittsburgh’s tests show numerous problems with the radar gun and how it was able to generate false readings from things such as cell phones and watches. They even obtained some completely random and spurious readings which they had no explanation for and were unable to reproduce.

This study also presents some new potential problems and/or reasons to false readings…the very computer system located in the vehicle – IIMS – (Incident Information Management System) installed by Motorola, however the study did not perform any further testing on this scenario. Motorola themselves performed their own study and report and stated:

The report concludes that the array of police lights, radios, computers and other power equipment overloads the cars’ electrical system and introduces electrical noise, which interferes with the computers and radar guns.

So, not only does the Pittsburgh study point to IIMS being a root of the problem, Motorola themselves states it is a problem! The sad thing about the University of Pittsburgh study is that the Pennsylvania State Police actually used it to show that there were no problems with the Genesis Handheld Stationary radar guns. Read the report and you will see how it clearly states and shows otherwise. The Pennsylvania State Police used it as their last and final resort to end the “Radargate Scandal”.


Download the report here.

John Timothy Shingara GHS Radar Testimony Transcript

Monday, April 28th, 2008

Here it is…the original transcript from Cumberland County v. Brent Hanlin in which John Timothy Shingara, who at the time was working in the Technical Support Division of the Pennsylvania State Police performing various radar and electronics duties, blew the whistle and let the public know the truth about Genesis Handheld Stationary (GHS) radar and its’ problems.

This very testimony cost John his career. He is currently fighting his own civil battles due to the retaliation he faced after testifying truthfully.


Download the transcript here.

Decatur Genesis Handheld Stationary (GHS) Radar Gun Operator’s Manual

Monday, April 28th, 2008

There’s no better way to build your defense for your speeding ticket case than by basing it off of the Genesis Handheld Stationary (GHS) operator’s manual. Know exactly how the tools the police use work and test THEIR knowledge on it. This document was faxed to me by an attorney and I share it with you. I advise reading this manual front to back so you know the basics of how the unit works. You can use this information in a cross-examination of the trooper. Touching on topics such as the limitations of Doppler Radar (p. 13-14), and making sure the trooper knows the limitations are a good start. If a trooper doesn’t know the limitations, then it SHOULD BE grounds for a dismissal, or at least help you prove the trooper is incompetent and not properly trained to use radar regardless of his/her training/certifications in it. If a trooper doesn’t know the limitations of Doppler radar, how do they know a false from an accurate reading or what can cause a false reading to occur? They wouldn’t, which any HONEST judge should immediately see as a problem and grounds for dismissal.


Download the GHS Radar Gun Operator’s Manual Here